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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Don't trust anyone over forty 
In an interview with Obshaya gazeta (26 Jun-2 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-204), 
Yevgeni Savostyanov deputy head of the president's administration in charge of 
personnel, revealed that he believed the "optimal age" for employees was forty 
years old. This younger generation, claims Savostynov (himself forty-five years 
old), is "more pragmatic, more aggressive. They are less inclined to be 
subordinate and want more to lead." 
 
Savostyanov also outlined in general terms the vetting process for state cadres, 
noting that his department does not participate in "appointments of the highest 
circle." Individual applications come into the Kremlin from the localities or 
departments, at which time they are researched through newspaper accounts 
and a special services' review. Before being interviewed personally through 
Savostyanov's office, a thorough "paper portrait" is prepared. Savostyanov's 
current goals for staffing include not only filling immediate openings throughout 
the executive branch, but also creating a "reserve bench" of qualified candidates 
from which the president could choose when the need arose. Savostyanov also 
noted that at present the president had responsibility for the selection of 
candidates to over 30,000 posts. 
 
Tennis anyone? 
Shamil Tarpishchev, the president's former tennis coach, adviser and sports 
minister, has recently been appointed as an aide to Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. 
Tarpishchev, who will advise Luzhkov on sports issues, is serving as a volunteer 
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and will probably be involved in the preparations for next year's World Youth 
Games to be held in Moscow. Tarpishchev was removed from his state post last 
fall in the wake of a scandal at the National Sports Foundation he founded. (See 
previous Digest reports) While some analysts view Tarpishchev's appointment as 
a move by Luzhkov to garner the support of the hardline camp that once 
surrounded President Yel'tsin, it is also possible that Yel'tsin would not object to 
his one-time ally resuming a quasi-political position. 
 
New decree suggests flexible view of powers 
While the government organs Rossiyskiye vesti (15 Jul 97) and Rossiyskaya 
gazeta (16 Jul 97) assert that the new decree on presidential representatives is 
little more than a restatement of the earlier-defined scope of representatives' 
powers, there are several elements of the decree that suggest a wide-range of 
possibilities for the president's regional delegates. While the primary duties of the 
representatives are to assist and inform the president and to interact with local 
organs, political parties and social organizations, the impact of these 
responsibilities will depend on each representatives access and relationship with 
the president, Kremlin and relevant federal officials.(Rossiyskaya gazeta, 16 Jul 
97; FBIS-SOV-97-204) 
 
The representatives are given oversight of local implementation of presidential 
and governmental decrees, federal laws and the disbursement of budgetary 
funds. In the past, the Control Department has had primary responsibility for 
supervision of presidential representatives, and while that connection is still 
present (representatives may protest to the Control Department if local organs 
fail to implement directives), the representatives are also given the right to 
petition "appropriate federal organs of executive authority." Theoretically, if a 
particular representative had ties to the Federal Security Services, he could 
appeal to the Moscow FSB for intervention. The representatives are also tasked 
with handling appeals from the local populace and addressing citizens' 
complaints. As with many state bureaucratic positions in Russia today, the job 
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description of a given post may prove less significant than the connections and 
access of the individual in the job. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Svyazinvest auction fallout continues 
The common cause of President Yel'tsin's re-election, which managed to bind 
together the major financial interests last year, has clearly broken down in the 
wake of the government auction of a 25 percent stake in the Russian 
telecommunications company Svyazinvest. Despite the loud protestations of First 
Deputy Prime Minister Nemtsov that the auction had been fair and delivered the 
shares to the highest bidder, complaints and conspiracy theories abound. 
Perhaps most interesting in the reaction to the auction is the role of various 
media outlets in fermenting or calming the brouhaha. 
 
The auction winner, a coalition including Oneximbank's Vladimir Potanin, has 
been attacked in the media owned by his primary rival, MOST's Vladimir 
Gusinsky. An alliance between Security Council Deputy Boris Berezovsky and 
Gusinsky may explain an attack on the auction by Russian Public Television 
(ORT). While Berezovsky has a significant interest in ORT, the government 
maintains a 51 percent share, which may explain the displeasure with which 
government officials received the ORT broadcast. (Ekho moskvy, 27 Jul 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-208) 
 
If the Svyazinvest auction has served no other function, it provides a warning to 
those who would attempt to interpret the Russian press without careful 
consideration of the financial and political interests underlying the ownership of 
any publication. 
 
State cadres to be cut 
First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov announced on 26 July that the 
personnel of federal organs of government would be cut by 10 percent. The 
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reduction in the number of "unnecessary officials" is intended to decrease 
budgetary expenditures. Nemtsov, who has direct supervision of the Fuel and 
Energy Ministry, claims he will slice even deeper into his own pie, cutting the 
ministry's personnel by 25 percent. (ITAR-TASS, 26 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-207) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger 
 
Russia boycotts NATO-Russia meeting until co-chairmanship is secured 
Vitaly Churkin, Russia's ambassador to the Permanent Joint Council with NATO, 
delayed the council's first meeting by four days, insisting that Russia be a co-
chair of its meetings. The council finally convened on 18 July, when the NATO 
secretary-general agreed to allow Churkin to chair one-third of the time. (ITAR-
TASS, 0740 GMT, 19 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-200). 
 
The "Founding Act" on NATO-Russian relations, signed on 27 May, says that the 
Permanent Joint Council "will be chaired jointly by the Secretary General of 
NATO, a representative of one of the NATO member states on a rotation basis, 
and a representative of Russia." Churkin objected to NATO Secretary-General 
Javier Solana's suggestion that, for the sake of continuity, he chair all the 
meetings. The chair will rotate according to the issues under discussion. ITAR-
TASS reported that the first meeting was divided into three parts, with one of the 
three representatives chairing a part. 
 
Foreign Ministry, Zyuganov both support law restricting religious groups 
Although Boris Yel'tsin eventually vetoed it, a law restricting religious freedom in 
Russia won the support of both Russia's Foreign Ministry and the leader of the 
Communist Party of Russia, Gennadi Zyuganov. 
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The bill, which would recognize only four "traditional" religions and would impose 
a fifteen-year waiting period on recognition of others, had been passed by the 
Duma but not signed by the president when the Foreign Ministry came to its 
defense. Faced with criticism from the United States Senate, the ministry 
released an official pronouncement. "No state," the Russian Federation Foreign 
Ministry announcement stressed, "can remain indifferent to offenses taking place 
on its territory." (Trud, 23 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-203) 
 
The Foreign Ministry did not explain why it was defending a bill that had not even 
yet become law. But its statement was in accord with the sentiments of National 
Patriotic Front leader Gennadi Zyuganov, who denounced the U.S. Senate's 
position as "trouble-making." (Sovetskaya rossiya, 22 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-203) 
 
Primakov highlights Sino-Russian friendship at ASEAN meeting 
Speaking on 27 July to a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov heralded the improvement 
in Russian-Chinese relations as "an impressive contribution to the cause of 
peace and security in the Asian-Pacific region." 
 
The joint declaration titled "On a Multi-polar World and Formation of a New 
International World Order," signed by the Russian and Chinese presidents in 
Moscow on 23 April, makes a strong statement "in favor of establishing a new 
world order based on equitable cooperation and account of the interests of each 
other as well as those of the rest of the world," Primakov told the diplomats 
gathered in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia. (Xinhua, 0833 GMT, 27 Jul 97; FBIS-CHI-
97-208). 
 
While in attendance at the ASEAN meeting, Primakov held talks with Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on an anticipated visit to Beijing by Russian 
president Boris Yel'tsin in the autumn. Primakov also discussed the rights of 
Japanese fishermen near the disputed Kuril Islands and plans to train Russian 
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businessmen in Tokyo with Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda. (Kyodo, 
0819 GMT, 29 Jul 97; FBIS-EAS-97-210). Before arriving in Malaysia, Primakov 
stopped over in South Korea, where he signed an agreement on compensation 
for the seized Tsarist embassy (Interfax, 0744 GMT, 25 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
206). 
 
A "Great Game" that no one wants to play 
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott called for nations interested in the 
affairs of the Caucasus to avoid a repeat of the 19th Century "Great Game" in 
their attempts to exploit the region's vast oil and natural gas reserves. 
 
Speaking at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on 21 
July, Talbott said that it had become fashionable to speak of an impending repeat 
of the struggle a century ago between Britain and Russia. He asked instead that 
"the geopolitics of oil" be conducted "in terms appropriate to the 21st century and 
not the 19th." (Reuters, 21 Jul 97) 
 
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Tarasov said that Russia had no 
interest in playing such a game, and was working instead for stability and 
democracy in Asia. (ITAR-TASS, 1546 GMT, 22 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-203) 
 
Russia accepts draft version of revisions to the CFE Treaty 
Russia gave preliminary approval to a draft of proposed revisions to the Treaty 
on Conventional Forces in Europe that circulated at a 23 July meeting in Vienna, 
Interfax reported. 
 
The two most significant changes would affect the new members of NATO and 
the nations of the Caucasus and Baltics. One would switch from a Cold War 
policy of weighing the weapons of NATO against Russia and its allies, and would 
measure arms deployments instead by region and individual nation. The draft 
revisions insist that new members of NATO from Eastern Europe decrease their 
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troop levels whenever troops from other NATO members are deployed on their 
territory. It also allows for an increase of Russian troops along the borders with 
the Baltic and Caucasian states. (Kurier, 25 Jul 97; FBIS-TAC-97-206) 
 
The document "is not a framework agreement yet, i.e. it is not a full package of 
the future treaty," Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Tarasov said. 
The treaty participants have not yet determined the term "existing forces" with 
regard to permanent deployment of NATO capabilities on the territory of new 
members of the alliance, he said. 
 
The flank agreement also needs further discussion, he said. All the figures set in 
the Treaty on Conventional Military Forces in Europe must be taken into account 




Let the games begin 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has condemned the pursuit of influence 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia as a mere replay of the nineteenth-century 
"Great Game," the battle between Britain and Russia for influence over the 
southwestern Asia. "Our goal," he told an audience at the Johns Hopkins School 
of Advanced International Studies, "is to avoid that atavistic outcome." 
 
Unfortunately, it takes two not to play. The United States may get up and walk 
away from the board, but that does not mean that Russia will stop moving its 
pieces forward. Indeed, the foreign policy of Russia's Yevgeni Primakov, 
obsessed with "multi-polarity," is bent on reducing the dominant position of the 
liberal West in world affairs. While "multi-polarity" may sound like a doctrine of 
cooperation that Talbott could endorse, it is in fact just the opposite. Rather than 
a world in which major players work together for mutual benefit, Primakov 
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imagines a globe divided into spheres of influence, each dominated by a regional 
hegemony. 
 
Nor can one compare a post-Cold War world to the clash of empires in the last 
century. The Caucasians and Central Asians today are organized into 
independent states. Even the most autocratic of these represents the interests of 
its people better than a foreign power could. These states ought to be allowed 
freedom of choice when making alliances; if most take the chance to align 
themselves with the liberal West, we ought to welcome their decision as a 
condemnation of neo-imperialism. To dismiss their ambitions to escape Russian 
influence would itself be an act of high hubris that denied these newly-
independent nations a role in their own affairs. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Political Parties and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
Duma urges Yel'tsin to keep peacekeepers in Abkhazia 
Yel'tsin is to recommend an extension of the peacekeeper's mandate before the 
CIS Council of Heads of State. 
 
The Duma's resolution says the withdrawal of peacekeepers from the region of 
the former armed conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia is premature. Future 
conflict in the regions may become a threat to the "territorial integrity" of the 
Russian Federation. The Duma has passed the resolution on the Federation 
Council for consideration. 
 
Although ostensibly a CIS affair, the entire CIS peacekeeping force is made up of 
Russian troops. For this reason, the Duma has urged the Russian Foreign 
 9 
Ministry to conduct direct negotiations with Georgia and Abkahazia on the 
stationing of its troops on their soil. 
 
By suggesting bilateral negotiations outside of the CIS framework, not to mention 
the peacekeeping mandate, it begins to look like the CIS is nothing more than a 
department within the Russian Foreign Ministry (ITAR-TASS, 1322 GMT, 23 Jun 
97; wnc.fedworld.gov) 
 
Chernomyrdin calls for extraordinary session 
Having recessed from mid-July to the first of September, members of the Duma 
may be recalled to consider several pressing matters of state. The law on 
sequestration of the 1997 budget and of the package of social bills introduced by 
the government are in need of decision making. As per Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin, "The country will encounter difficulties in ensuring the stable 
payment of wages and pensions unless these problems are resolved." 
 
Here can be seen one of the limits of the present Russian parliamentary system. 
Week- or month-long recesses can be awkward in a system dependent upon 
parliamentary action. Indeed, it provides the executive branch with an opportunity 
to act without parliamentary response. Given Russian political reality, however, 
the Duma possess no real threat to presidential power, but should the present 
system endure, the protracted period of "vacation" will have to be amended 
(Interfax, 1559 GMT, 30 Jun 97; wnc.fedworld.gov). 
 
ELECTIONS 
Kemerovo regional gubernatorial elections set 
The region is finally slated to have a democratically elected governor. Elections 
will be held on 19 October. Debates leading up to the law which set the date for 
the elections raged between the regional Legislative Assembly and Governor 
Mikhail Kislyuk as to which branch should control the lion's share of political 
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authority. The bill was signed with the proviso that the issue remain on the table 
for discussion later. 
 
In effect, Kislyuk -- the last remaining appointed governor in the federation -- was 
at a disadvantage in negotiating with the democratically elected Legislative 
Assembly. Federal law states that each region or subject is to pass the 
appropriate laws on its future upon the democratic election of all branches of 
government. Since Kislyuk is an appointee, it hardly seems appropriate that he 
should attempt to fashion Kemerovo's democratic structure (Interfax in English, 
1101 GMT, 20 June 1997; wnc.fedworld.gov) 
 
On 1 July 1997, Yel'tsin reassigned Kislyuk to "another job," the nature of which 
is unknown. Kislyuk had been critical of Moscow's handling of the region's coal 
industry and had been supportive of all-Russia union strikes. He was replaced, 
ironically, by his predecessor, Aman Tuleyev, who also had been removed by 
Yel'tsin for his role in the 1991 coup which ousted Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev. Tuleyev was relieved of his duties as Minister for CIS Affairs 
(Interfax, 1141 GMT, 1 Jul 97; wnc.fedworld.gov). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
 
Cooperation seen between subgroups  
CIS deputy executive secretaries met with the heads of executive agencies of the 
Alliance of the Four (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia), the 
Belarusian-Russian Union and the Interstate Council of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan at the CIS headquarters in mid July "to discuss ways of 
increasing the efficiency of the interstate executive agencies established in the 
CIS." According to Belapan (18 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-199), the participants 
agreed "to co-ordinate their activities in implementing agreements concluded 
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within the framework of the above-mentioned alliances." Additionally, the parties 
agreed to "commit themselves to assist each other in establishing direct contacts 
with international scientific, information, production and other organizations." 
Cooperation agreements within these organizations is nothing new and is 
actually quite unremarkable. This, however, appears to be the first instance of 
cooperation among these groups. 
 
Agreement to provide air defense protection 
Dushanbe Radio reported on 29 July (FBIS-SOV-97-210) that the chairman of 
the coordination committee for legal issues at the Council of Ministers of the 
Defense of CIS MemberStates and Chief Commander of Russian Air Defense, 
Army General Viktor Plotnikov, was due in Tashkent to sign documents of 
cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan which will provide air defense 
protection to the "southern frontiers" of the CIS. It is not yet clear whether this is 




Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Mark Jones 
 
MOLDOVA 
No farewell to arms  
According to Tiraspol leader Igor Smirnov, "All armaments of the former 14th 
army, situated at the territory of Dniester, are the property of Dniester republic." 
Smirnov made the statement at a meeting with representatives of the Russian 
Ministry of Defense. Although the commander of Russian troops, LTG Valeriy 
Evnevich, expressed his concern over the poor condition of the arms and the 
difficulties associated with their secure storage, Smirnov declared that his side 
was "ready to provide for storage and security of the armaments"(Chisinau 
Infotag, 21 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-202). If the arms are given to the Dniester 
 12 
Republic, it will be interesting to see if they end up rotting in place, being sold on 
the black market, or being fired at Moldovan, Ukrainian, and Russian 
peacekeepers. 
 
New deputy chairman of parliament chosen  
Andrei Diaconu, a member of the Moldovan Agrarian Democratic Party (PDAM), 
was elected deputy chairman of the Moldovan Parliament. The ex-deputy 
chairman, Dumitru Diacov, was voted out of office amid claims of fraud. 
According to Diacov, votes for his dismissal, especially from the Socialist party, 
were purposely miscounted (Basapress, 18 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-209). 
 
BELARUS 
Prime minister resigns  
Belarusian Prime Minister Syarhey Linh submitted a letter of resignation to 
President Lukashenka in mid July. Linh cited age as his reason for stepping 
down. (Interfax, 17 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-198) 
 
Union intelligence service to be established  
Interfax (26 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-207) is reporting that a new security service will 
be set up under the auspices of the Belarusian-Russian Union. The purpose of 
the future organization is "to give the Union's Supreme Soviet and Executive 
Council information to prevent possible threats to the Union's security and help 
the leadership of the Russian Federal Security Service and the Belarusian KGB 
in the priority fields of joint work." One can only wonder if the service's 
employees will call themselves "Chekists." 
 
Problems with the neighbors 
On 21 July the Russian gas company Gazprom cut gas deliveries to Belarus by 
50% (Interfax, 21 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-202). The reason for the cutback was 
reportedly huge unpaid Belarusian gas bills. 
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Another example of un-neighborly relations occurred when a camera team from 
Russia's ORT TV broadcasting company was temporarily detained on the 
Belarusian-Lithuanian border as they shot footage on the activities of Belarusian 
border guards. According to Interfax (22 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-203), the ORT 
office had applied for permission a week prior to send the camera team, but the 
State Border Committee did not reply in writing. The journalists learned that the 
border guards had been "advised not to talk to ORT correspondents." The 
Belarusian Committee for State Security then opened a criminal case against the 
team on charges of violating the Belarusian state frontier (ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 28 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-209). The incident touched off a wave of 
condemnations by both domestic and foreign press representatives, but it is in 
keeping with President Lukashenka's recent directives to get tough on foreign 
journalists as well as his own Customs and Border Services. 
 
Lawyer's rights curtailed 
An article appeared in the Minsk newspaper Svoboda (18 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
202) detailing the plight of lawyer Nadzeya Dudarava. The paper reported that 
she is about to lose her right to practice law because she has failed to comply 
with the directive of Justice Minister H. Varantsow. Varantsow decreed that "as of 
1 July 1997, the persons who did not join a collegium of lawyers have no right to 
pursue their practice of law and their licenses are to be annulled by the Justice 
Ministry." This is one example of the fallout from President Lukashenka's 
presidential decree No. 12, by which he decided to "improve" the activity of 
lawyers and notaries by obliging them to join collegiums controlled by the state. 
 
UKRAINE 
Air defense chiefs meet 
Commanders of the Air Defense Forces of Russia and Ukraine signed a group of 
bilateral cooperation agreements during their meeting in Kiev. Interfax (16 Jul 97; 
FBIS-UMA-97-197) reported that the two chiefs also worked out a draft 
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agreement on control of the airspace over the Black Sea. The proposed accord 
will be "be handed over to the Foreign Ministers for compromising." 
 
Involvement in regional issues increases 
Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye (31 May-6 Jun 97; FBIS-UMA-97-136-S) 
reported that Ukraine will provide Uzbekistan with armored vehicle repair and 
maintenance services. The Deputy Minister of Machine-Building, the Military-
Industrial Complex and Conversion of Ukraine, Valeriy Kazakov, noted that there 
is already a successfully completed intergovernmental agreement for deliveries 
of aviation goods, and he believes that "there is every opportunity for further 
cooperation of the two countries in the field of military technology." 
 
Hennadiy Udovenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that Ukraine will take 
part in the construction of the Turkmenistan-Armenia gas pipeline by supplying 
pipes and equipment. (Lvov Infobank, 15 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-196). 
 
Foreign Minister Udovenko also visited Estonia for a two-day official visit. On his 
agenda were discussions relating to economic relations, regional politics, and 
security issues (Estonian Television Network, 24 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-205). 
 
All of these stories taken together reflect that Ukraine continues to develop as a 
regional leader (and competitor) in the economic, military, and political spheres. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Yel'tsin confirms Russian withdrawal from Caspian oil field deal 
On 7 August President Yel'tsin told President Niyazov of Turkmenistan that 
Russian companies would not participate in developing the Kyapaz oil field. (RIA, 
7 Aug 97; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 Aug 97) The field lies on the 
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boundary between Azerbaijan's and Turkmenistan's sectors of the Caspian and 
is claimed by both countries. During President Aliev's visit to Moscow in July, the 
Russian oil companies Lukoil and Rosneft signed a contract with Azerbaijan's oil 
company SOCAR to develop that field, but signaled they would pull out of the 
deal when Turkmenistan issued its objections. Moscow found itself in an 
awkward position; since it does not recognize the sectored division of the sea but 
favors a condominium arrangement whereby all development must be cleared 
with all the coastal states, it could hardly fail to accommodate Turkmenistan's 
objections. 
 
Aliev's US visit 
In the spring, Aliev was invited to the US to meet President Clinton as part of the 
US lobbying effort for Azerbaijan's ratification of the CFE Treaty. Until recently 
US policy towards Azerbaijan has been dominated by the Armenian lobby which 
succeeded in passinga prohibition on humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan, Section 
907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act. This law remains in force and the US has 
given Armenia five times as much as it gave to Azerbaijan. Over the last two 
years, as the possibility of tapping into the Caspian Sea oil reserves became 
increasingly viable, the major oil companies have enlisted top former officials to 
lobby the administration and Congress on Azerbaijan's behalf. Among the 
personalities who have lent their credentials to altering the imbalance in US 
policy are two former national security advisers, Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski; former White House Chief of Staff John Sununu; former Defense 
Secretary Richard C. Cheney; former Secretary of State James A. Baker III; and 
former Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen. (Washington Post, 6 Jul 97) 
 
On 28 July President Aliev began his first visit to the US by meeting with UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, who voiced support for the OSCE proposals on 
Nagorno-Karabakh. (Turan, 29 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-210). On 31 July, Aliev 
described the latest OSCE Minsk Group initiatives during a lecture at 
Georgetown University. Aliev used a map to illustrate the proposals; in the first 
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stage, Armenian forces leave the six non-Karabakh Azeri districts they currently 
occupy and OSCE troops are stationed along the Karabakh border. In the 
second stage, the parties negotiate the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia 
withdraws its forces from Shusha and Lachin. The Lachin corridor remains as a 
link between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and is policed by OSCE forces. In 
regard to the status of Karabakh, Aliev reiterated Azerbaijan's long-held position 
that the region can have the highest degree of autonomy short of independence. 
(Turan, 31 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-212) Although divulging the details of the 
proposals is contrary to the rules of confidentiality governing the peace process, 
the content of the proposals in fact had appeared in the press before he gave this 
speech. 
 
On July 31 Aliev met with Defense Secretary Cohen in Washington and signed 
an agreement on bilateral military cooperation. They agreed to hold regular 
consultations on security issues and military cooperation at the level of defense 
minister. Further details of what that cooperation entails were not available, but if 
the joint statement they released serves as any indication, the military 
cooperation is conditional on a settlement of the Karabakh conflict. "The sides 
agreed that the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict as soon as possible 
would create broad opportunities to strengthen Azerbaijani-American relations in 
the defense sphere." Secretary Cohen expressed his wish to "propose a 
programme of cooperation enabling the development of the Azerbaijani armed 
forces under conditions of democratic and civilian control." He further suggested 
that this program may include contacts between senior military personnel, 
military training, preparation of military budgets and the management of armed 
forces reserves. (Turan, 1 Aug 97; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 Aug 
97) 
 
On 1 August Aliev had a three-hour meeting with President Clinton during which 
they discussed expanding bilateral cooperation in the political, security, 
economic, and commercial spheres; the OSCE Minsk Group proposals on 
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Nagorno-Karabakh; the importance of their commercial relationship; Azerbaijan's 
economic reform program and its integration into international financial and 
security structures. 
 
The joint statement emphasized that President Aliev has "endorsed the recent 
proposal of the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group as the basis for intensified 
negotiations to achieve a peace agreement this year." For his part, "President 
Clinton reiterated the administration's strong support for the repeal of Section 
907." The presidents "welcomed the establishment of an official dialogue on 
energy policy and commercial issues ...[and] agreed on the vital importance of 
the Eurasian transport corridor to the economic future of Azerbaijan and the 
entire region. The two presidents welcomed the signing of the US.-Azerbaijani 
Bilateral Investment Treaty and the US Export Bank Incentive Agreement." (US 
Newswire, 1 Aug 97) 
 
On the same day three new oil contracts valued at $10 billion were signed with 
Amoco, Chevron, Exxon and Mobil. (US Newswire, 1 Aug 97) 
 
Iran condemns oil deals concluded in Washington 
On 5 August Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister, Mahmud Vaezi, condemned 
Azerbaijan's "unilateral steps" in developing oil wells in the Caspian and 
described the most recent Azeri-US contracts as an action that "brings nothing 
but tension between the states bordering the sea and risks a crisis in the region." 
(Agence France Presse, 5 Aug 97) This statement comes only days after a US 
decision to make an exception to the rule forbidding the involvement of US 
companies in business ventures with Iran; US companies will be able to 
participate in constructing a pipeline from Turkmenistan to the Persian Gulf by 
way of Iran. 
 
This announcement had obvious implications for Azerbaijan; it opens the door to 
the possibility of transporting Azeri oil across Iran. Yet, it seems that US 
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reluctance to deal with Iran is only one factor thwarting this plan; the strained 
relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan may prove an even more formidable 
obstacle. Iran is home to an ethnic Azeri population roughly equal to the 
population of Azerbaijan. Some Azeri movements had sought a reunion with 
"Southern Azerbaijan" (which lies just across the border in Iran), and although 
the current government has not furthered such designs, Teheran remains wary of 
the possibility of a secessionist movement in its northern districts. In 1995 
President Aliev, bowing to Clinton administration pressure, cut Iran out of the 
largest oil deal in the Caspian. That action was particularly embarrassing for Iran 
because it was originally announced that Iran would participate and then, after 
intensive US lobbying, Iran's shares were distributed to US companies. Although 
Azerbaijan and Iran have signed development contracts since then, these were 
for smaller, less-visible projects that never earned "contract of the century" 
billing. In recent months Aliev barred the pro-Iranian political party, Islamic Party, 
from holding a congress and other electioneering activities. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Inter-Tajik peace process on track; military, police forces downsized  
President Rahmonov and United Tajik Opposition (UTO) leader Said Abdullo 
Nuri signed a mutual amnesty act ("Document on Mutual Forgiveness") on 14 
July 1997, completing another significant step in the inter-Tajik peace process 
(ITAR-TASS, 1406 GMT, 14 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-195). A few days later (18-20 
July), the long-delayed POW exchange finally took place, fulfilling one of the 
conditions set out in the general peace agreement which both sides signed on 27 
June, in Moscow. The POW exchange occurred in three stages and included a 
total of 48 prisoners from each side (originally the number of prisoners 
exchanged was to be 50). The operation was overseen by representatives of the 
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UN military mission and both sides agreed to further POW swaps in the near 
future (Interfax, 1124 GMT, 20 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-201). 
 
Perhaps as a sign of confidence in the peace process, President Rahmonov 
decreed a 30% staff reduction in the personnel of: the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Tajikistan, 
the Committee for State Border Protection under the government of the Republic 
of Tajikistan, the Presidential Guard of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Committee 
for Emergency Situations and Civil Protection under the government of the 
Republic of Tajikistan, and the Special Rapid Reaction Brigade. The decree was 
issued on 10 July and is to be carried out over the next four weeks in order to 
make more funding available to raise the salaries of teachers and scientists and 
to bolster the social safety net (Radio Tajikistan Network, 1200 GMT, 10 Jul 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-191). Although the Tajik government is no doubt in need of 
additional funds in order to begin rebuilding the country, it is also interesting to 
note that two of the bodies whose staffs are to be reduced are the Special Rapid 
Reaction Brigade and the Presidential Guard, both of which have been plagued 
by incidents of mutiny. The Presidential Guard was also unable to capture the 
renegade militia leader Rezvon Sodirov, who is rumored to still be at large in the 
country. 
 
Andrei Nikolaev, director of the Russian Federal Border Services, told reporters 
in Moscow earlier in the month that the possibility now existed of implementing a 
gradual reduction of the number of border troops stationed in Tajikistan. He also 
informed reporters that the border guards had so far halted more than 80 
attempted illegal border crossings from Afghanistan and had been engaged in 13 
border skirmishes, ostensibly with UTO groups. The Russian border guards are 
apparently working in cooperation with Afghan forces (it was not specified which 
forces) to stop illegal border crossings, using the 25 km security zone established 
in August 1996 (this security zone permits Russian troops to pass up to 25 km 
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across the Afghan border) to catch and detain smugglers and "militants"(Interfax, 
1008 GMT, 2 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-183). 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Chinese firm wins stake in Kazakh oil fields, will build second pipeline 
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) offered the winning bid in the 
international auction for a 60% stake in Aktobemunajgaz, a Kazakh company 
which controls two of Kazakhstan's western oil fields. The two fields have 
reserves of 590 million tons of petroleum and 220 billion cubic meters of gas. The 
Chinese company plans to invest more than 300 million US dollars in the 
development of these oil fields, which will allow their annual production to double 
(from 2.60 million tons of oil in 1996) (Xinhua, 1506 GMT, 4 Jun 97; FBIS-CHI-
97-155). The Chinese company has also agreed to construct an oil pipeline from 
Kazakhstan to the Karamai oil field in western China, where it would be linked to 
an already existing pipeline which runs to eastern China. Apparently a number of 
Japanese and South Korean oil and gas companies have also expressed interest 
in backing this pipeline construction project. Kazakhstan expects its oil 
production to be more than 100 million tons by 2005, which would exceed the 
capacity of the pipeline to be built by the Caspian pipeline consortium (from 
Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil fields to Novorossiisk, a Russian port on the Black Sea). 
Therefore, a second pipeline route is necessary (Interfax, 1527 GMT, 6 Jun 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-157). 
 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan plan pipeline route via Georgia, excluding Russia  
In mid-June, Presidents Aliev and Nazarbaev signed an agreement on 
cooperation between their two republics, which also includes plans for the 
construction of an underwater oil pipeline linking Aktau (Kazakh Caspian port) 
and Baku. The pipeline would then travel through Georgia to the Turkish port of 
Ceyhan. President Nazarbaev has declared that Kazakhstan will eventually 
require several pipelines to transport all of the oil which it expects to produce. No 
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date has yet been given for the construction of the Aktau-Baku pipeline route 
(Rossiyskaya gazeta, 5 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-190) . 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Kyrgyz water no longer free of charge 
Following the presentation of a report on the interstate use of Kyrgyzstan's water 
resources by the other Central Asian republics issued by a commission headed 
by the parliamentary speaker, the Kyrgyz legislature (or more accurately, the 
Assembly of People's Representatives of the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz 
Republic) passed a resolution to begin charging fees for the use of its water 
resources (reservoirs, rivers, irrigation systems, etc.) by the other Central Asian 
republics. The resolution included the statement that, according to international 
law, Kyrgyzstan's water supply cannot be considered the common property of all 
the Central Asian republics, even though it was treated as such by the Soviet 
government. The Kyrgyz government has had to shoulder the financial burden of 
maintaining its water resource system since the collapse of the former USSR, 
and can no longer afford to provide water to the other republics free of charge. 
The prices for the use of Kyrgyzstan's water supply will be set in accordance with 
international norms (Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 3 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-199). 
 
Comment 
The borders of the Central Asian republics were established in such a way that 
no single republic can be completely self-sufficient in terms of its water 
resources. The republics must tap into each other's rivers and reservoirs in order 
to provide enough water to irrigate their crops, not the least important of which is 
the cotton crop. Despite the fact that it was largely the huge increase in cotton 
cultivation during Soviet times which caused the Aral Sea to shrink to its present 
size, since becoming independent most of the Central Asian governments have 
chosen to raise cotton production even higher, because it is a valuable cash crop 
and export on the world market. Kyrgyzstan's decision to begin demanding 
payment for the use of its water resources could mark the start of a serious battle 
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among the Central Asian republics over water rights. For instance, Kyrgyzstan is 
claiming ownership of the Naryn River, which forms its border with Uzbekistan. 
No doubt, the Uzbek government will dispute this claim, and perhaps demand 
compensation from the Kyrgyz government for its use of water from this river. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Mixed signals provided on security options 
Having lost out on the first round of NATO expansion during the 8-9 July summit 
in Madrid, the Baltic states are adamant about continuing their efforts to join the 
alliance in later years. Whether they will receive support for such a venture from 
the west is unclear, as the United States sends mixed signals. US Secretary of 
State Madeline Albright, in a visit to Vilnius following the summit, reassured the 
Baltic states of continued US support for Baltic aspirations, saying that "Madrid 
was a point of departure for the new NATO, not a final destination. NATO's door 
will remain open in Madrid, a promise was kept. We do consider the Baltic States 
as serious candidates for future NATO membership." (Department of State text, 
14 Jul 97) Questioned about Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's 
recent offer of security guarantees to the Baltic states, Albright had little comment 
except to reiterate that it is up to the Baltic states to decide upon security 
guarantors. (The countries have declined Russia's offer.) 
 
Despite Albright's assurances of continued support, the Clinton administration 
sent an entirely different message the same week, with the nomination of 
Stephen Sestanovich, .a vocal opponent of NATO expansion, as Ambassador-at-




The news from countries closer to home was a little more encouraging: After a 
meeting with their Baltic colleagues, presidents Aleksandr Kwasniewski from 
Poland, Vaclav Havel from the Czech Republic and Arpad Goncz of Hungary, 
having received the sought-after NATO invitation in Madrid, said they would act 
as special advocates for early Baltic admission, Latvian President Guntis 
Ulmanis reported. (Radio Riga Network, 9 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-190) 
 
LATVIA 
New government coalition formed following Skele's resignation 
Andrus Skele resigned as prime minister of Latvia on 28 July, after the three 
largest parties in the government announced their intention to leave the coalition 
(Radio Riga Network, 1300 GMT, 25 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-206). The resignation 
followed months of charges of corruption leveled against government ministers 
(resulting in the resignation of four since May). In addition to internal squabbles, 
the country faced problems from the outside as well, such as exclusion from the 
first wave of NATO expansion and from negotiations with the European Union, 
following a recommendation by the European Commission to begin talks with 
only one Baltic state, Estonia. (Radio Riga Network, 1300 GMT, 18 Jul 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-199) To replace Skele, President Ulmanis nominated Guntars Krasts of 
the Union for the Fatherland and Freedom party and a former minister of 
economics (in a previous Skele government). 
 
LITHUANIA 
Eight registered as presidential candidates 
The list of candidates for the presidential elections on December 21 has grown. 
Eight candidates have registered for the ballot, including the Seimas speaker 
Vytautas Landsbergis, US environmentalist Valdus Adamkus, chairman of the 
Lithuanian Reform Party, Algirdas Pilvelis; prosecutor general Arturas 
Paulauskas; media entrepreneur and anthropology professor Liucija 
Baskauskaite; head of Catholic radio Vaidotas Zukas; chairman of the newly 
created Eurosceptic party Rimantas Smetona; and the leader of the Christian 
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Democrat Union and member of parliament Kazys Bobelis. (ELTA, 1025 GMT, 
245 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-205) 
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